UDC

141.12+165.12

DOI

10.37482/2687-1505-V251

Authors

Matvey S. Sysoev
Voronezh State Pedagogical University; ul. Lenina 86, Voronezh, 394043, Russian Federation;
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1152-577X e-mail: sysoev.paritet@gmail.com

Abstract

The paper compares two problems in the analytical philosophy of mind: the hard problem of consciousness and the combination problem for panpsychism. The former arises for a wide range of materialist approaches, including physicalism. Panpsychism is asserted by its proponents as the best solution to the combination problem. However, panpsychism itself is faced with the combination problem. A comparison of these problems demonstrates that constitutive panpsychism is fundamentally incapable of solving the hard problem of consciousness. This is demonstrated by the structural and substantive similarity of the arguments in favour of each problem. The author shows that constitutive panpsychism is an extension of physicalism specifically designed to solve the hard problem. Further, the arguments from conceivability in favour of the hard and combination problems are compared, demonstrating their structural similarity. In addition, the author points out the substantive similarity of these problems by comparing individual types of argumentations. This allows us to accept the hypothesis that one of the reasons for the problems of panpsychism and physicalism may lie in mereological atomism, which unites these approaches. Thus, the association of the hard and combination problems can serve as an argument against mereological atomism in both panpsychism and physicalism. Based on the analysis of both problems, general conclusions are drawn about the prospects for the approaches in question and a direction of research is proposed in which the general problems of constitutive panpsychism and physicalism could be solved. It is shown that there is at least one acceptable naturalistic alternative to atomism: priority monism, which can be a strategy for solving the considered problems for both physicalism and panpsychism.

Keywords

hard problem of consciousness, combination problem, panpsychism, physicalism, priority monism, mereological atomism

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