UDC

1(091):165.42+130.3

Authors

Nikolay B. Tetenkov
Northern (Arctic) Federal University named after M.V. Lomonosov; prosp. Lomonosova 4, Arkhangelsk, 163002, Russian Federation;
e-mail: tenibo@yandex.ru

Abstract

This article considers the understanding of the category of subjectivity from the standpoint of religious worldview and, in particular, Christianity. Any person has an aim, in which he/she is interested and which he/she pursues. Thus, subjectivity is impossible without passion. By passion S. Kierkegaard understands not a sensual, bodily desire, but an idea that captures a person. Kierkegaard’s understanding of passion, in our opinion, is close to Deleuze’s interpretation of an idea as a task. Having lost his/her passion, a person loses his/her human essence and turns into a fantastic thing. For the religious worldview, the highest passion is the attainment of supreme happiness: faith. For Kierkegaard, Christianity is inherently subjective, not objective, since God is a subject, not an object, and exists only in subjectivity, while God is maintained through the infinite passion of the inner. A necessary condition for the faith is a paradox that allows us to perpetuate the historical and historicize the eternal. S. Kierkegaard sees the development of subjectivity in the fact that a thinking subject performs any action having in mind his/ her own existence, which is of the highest interest to him/her. The difference between thinking and acting, according to S. Kierkegaard, lies in the fact that we refer possibility, indifference and objectivity to thinking, while attributing subjectivity to action. If we want to perform an action, thinking remains thinking, it does not become an action, but there arises an opportunity generating an interest in reality and in action. A subjective thinker is at the same time an existing individual and a thinker, though he does not abstract from his own existence and absolute difference and thinks while remaining within existence.

Keywords

S. Kierkegaard, religious worldview, subjectivity, subjectivе thinker, multiple subjectivity, passion of the inner, absolute passion

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